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School Desegregation Problems in the South:
An Historical Perspective*
Frank M. Johnson, Jr. *
I was pleased to accept the invitation of the University of
Minnesota Law Forum to be with you and to speak to you
today. Most of you are probably aware that federal judges
rarely make public statements outside of the courtroom or judicial opinions. This is as it should be because it is virtually impossible for a judge who has been completely removed from the
political and business world-in order more nearly to maintain
an impartiality necessary for the performance of his duties-to
say anything that will not be interpreted as an official position or
judicial attitude. I have usually made an exception to this rule
when invited to speak to university and college groups and especially to law students.
My topic-School Desegregation Problems in the Southseems particularly appropriate because so much of the progress
accomplished in the field of school desegregation has been
brought about through the efforts and courage of lawyers and
young people. The recent Supreme Court decisions and President Nixon's statement have made this topic a timely one as
well.
When the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous
decision in Brown v. Board of Education', (Brown I), no one
had given much thought to the problem of implementation.
Argument had focused on whether segregated schools were
Inherently unequal and on the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. The Court
asked for further argument on the nature of the relief to be
granted, saying:
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability
of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conin these cases presents probditions, the formulation of decrees
2
lems of considerable complexity.

Surely one of the great understatements in the literature of the
law!
* Address delivered before the University of Minnesota Law
Forum, April 17, 1970.
** Chief Judge, United States District Court, Middle District of
Alabama.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2. Id. at 495.
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The questions propounded by the Court indicated that the
Justices were considering several alternative approaches in May
of 1954. The Court asked whether a decree should be entered
permitting Negro children to attend forthwith the schools of
their choice or whether the Court could "in the exercise of its
equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be
brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not
based on color distinctions?" 3 Assuming the gradual approach
were taken, the Court asked, should the Supreme Court formulate detailed decrees; if so, what specific issues should the
decrees reach; should the Court appoint a special master to
hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for
such decrees, or should the Court remand to the courts of
first instance with directions to frame decrees?
On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion on how and when desegregation would be required, adopting
the now famous "all deliberate speed" formula.4 The key
features of the decision were:
All provisions of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this (Brown I] principle. Full implementation of these constitutional principles
may require solution of varied local school problems ....
[T]he
courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954,
ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find
that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an
effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to
establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and
is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.5
The cases were remanded to the courts which had originally
heard them because those courts, owing to "their proximity to
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings,"'
could best perform the judicial appraisal of the good faith of the
school systems' proposals for the "solution of varied local school
problems" which might arise in the full implementation of the
Brown I principles.
Although the Court twice made it clear that desegregation was not to be blocked because of disagreement with constitutional principles which required it, the Justices clearly expected
cooperation and compliance from both the local school boards
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 496 n.13.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
Id. at 298-300.
Id. at 299.
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and the lower courts. There are some who believe it received
precious little from either.
I would like to describe to you some impressions of the
Fifth Circuit's experience with school desegregation litigation,
and, more particularly, my experiences in the Alabama state7
wide case-Lee v. Macon County Board of Education.
The first thing which impresses the student of school desegregation in the deep South is the slowness with which it has
proceeded. No Negroes attended white primary or secondary
schools in Alabama until 1963. The record elsewhere was
little better. When resistance finally began to crumble, the meager result of massive litigation was tokenism. In the 1963-64
school year, the 11 states of the Confederacy had 1.17 percent of
their Negro students in schools with white students. In 1964-65,
the percentage doubled, reaching 2.25 percent. In 1965-66, with
increasing pressure from the Fifth Circuit, a few district
courts, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) Guidelines, the percentage climbed to 6.01 percent.
The border states had a higher percentage of desegregation,
but Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi still had fewer than
1 percent of their Negro students attending schools with white
students. By 1965, 56 percent of the South's school districts
had desegregation policies but only about 11 percent of the
total Negro enrollment attended desegregated schools. In 1966,
97 percent of the school districts were in official compliance
with the HEW Guidelines or under court order, but the actual
attendance of Negroes in formerly all-white schools was less than
16 percent for the border and deep South states.
There are many reasons for the long delay between the
declaration of the right to attend desegregated schools and its
implementation. The profound disagreement of most regions
of the deep South is probably the most important single factor.
School board members, regardless of their personal feelings,
were pressured to resist by their constituencies. Opposition to
"Washington" and the federal courts soon became political issues, and unscrupulous politicians quickly learned to exploit the
problem instead of attempting to deal with it. The political
aspects of this problem were aggravated by the disenfranchisement of the Negroes until recently.
For example, the Board of Education in Little Rock had
prepared a stair-step integration plan for the Arkansas capital
7. 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
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before any litigation had begun. The federal district court
rejected a challenge to the plan brought by Negro parents
who argued that the plan was too drawn out. When it came time
for the entrance of the Negro students into Central High
School- in the fall of 1957, Governor Faubus stepped in to
block their admission. The furor that was unnecessarily created led to a severe setback for desegregation and the defeat at
the next election of those incumbent members of the Board of
Education, not to mention Congressman Brooks Hays, who had
voted for the desegregation plan.
Resistance took many forms; some were spectacular, like
sending state troopers and governors to stand in schoolhouse
doors. Others were mere bombast, like the interposition and
nullification resolutions passed by several state legislatures. 8
Of some effect, certainly, was the pressure applied by the
white community against Negro parents and children who
brought legal actions and tried to exercise their right to attend
desegregated schools.
The Alabama Legislature was particularly active. That
august body did not even wait for the Brown decision, but
took notice of the pendency of the cases in the Supreme Court
and in a Joint Resolution, adopted September 21, 1953, appointed
an interim committee to prepare
such legislation, including submission of Constitutional
amendments, as may be required to protect the interests of the
State and its citizens in the event of a decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States which destroys or impairs the principle of separation of the races in the public schools of this
State.9

The committee reported to the Legislature at the next regular session in 1955 and proposed the repeal of section 256 of the
Alabama Constitution, which expressly prohibited the operation of desegregated schools, and the enactment of a panoply of
legislation designed to replace the constitutional provision
which so obviously would have acted as a lightning rod for Negro plaintiffs and the federal courts. The Legislature responded enthusiastically. A pupil assignment law was enacted
that session, 10 which included several ingenious provisions.
Among them was a grandfather clause which required students
to continue in their old schools unless their parents applied for

a transfer.

The assignment law provided for a system of ad-

8. E.g., No. 42, [1956] Ala. Acts Spec. Sess. 70.
9. No. 894, [1953] Ala. Acts 1201.
10. No. 201, [1955] Ala. Acts 492.
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ministrative review and appeal to the state courts, which would
effectively render any application moot by the time it could be
reviewed by a federal court because the school year would be
over before a final determination would have been made. The
1955 Act did not make integration illegal, as had been done in
several other states,'. but it permitted any parent to keep his
child out of any school "in which the races are commingled" and promised State assistance for children who
withdrew from integrated schools. 12
The next year, in special session, the Legislature passed a
Resolution of Interposition and Nullification which was more
colorful than efficacious. 13 A three-judge district court declared that "[i]t amounted to no more than a protest, an escape
valve through which the legislators blew off steam to relieve
their tensions" and declined to dignify it with a declaration of its
unconstitutionality. 4 In 1957, the Legislature repealed the
compulsory school attendance laws and authorized school districts to close any of their schools if the local board determined
that
the continued operation of such school will be accompanied by
such tensions, friction or potential disorder or ill will within
the school as substantially to impair effective standards or
objectives of education of its pupils, or by potential impairment
of peace, order and good will in the community, school district,
or county involved .... 15
The local boards were authorized to turn the closed physical
plants over to "private" schools set up to avoid desegregation 6
or to provide support for parents who sent their children to private schools.' 7 Another statute declared the school boards to
be "judicial" bodies and granted them "the immunities of all
other judicial tribunals" of the State. 8 The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that a county personnel board could not be
sued for refusing to allow a Negro to take a competitive examination to become a policeman because, acting as a judicial body,
it was immune from suit. 9
11. E.g., No. 555, [1954] La. Acts 1036.
12. No. 201, [1955] Ala. Acts 492.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372,
381 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
15. ALA. CODE, tit. 52, § 61(13) (Supp. 1969).
16. ALA. CODE, tit. 52, § 61(16) (Supp. 1969).
17. No. 528, § 5, [1957] Ala. Acts 724.
18. ALA. CODE, tit. 52, § 61(11) (Supp. 1969).
19. Johnson v. Yeilding, 267 Ala. 108, 100 So. 2d 29 (1958).
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The ultimate weapon in the State's arsenal was the threat
to close the public schools rather than desegregate. This potential bomb was not defused until 1965 when the Supreme
Court held, in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,20 that Negro students' constitutional right to
the equal protection of the laws had been denied when the
Prince Edward County, Virginia, public schools were closed
to avoid desegregation and the State gave tuition grants and
tax concessions to assist white students to attend private segregated schools.
Today the threat is that white students will flee to private
segregated schools leaving an all-black public school system.
Desegregation will have been defeated and, once the white
students have left the system, the local white government, it is
argued, will refuse to support the public schools which will then
deteriorate. The Supreme Court has held that the district
courts may not yield to the threat that white students will abandon the public schools. 21 But the Court has not indicated
what a district court faced with a now all-black public school
system should do. Griffin may provide authority for keeping
the public schools open and tax supported up to an acceptable
standard, although there was a dissent by Justices Clark and
Harlan on that question. To the extent that whites flee in
those districts where they are a minority, the problem of adequate
financial support for the public school system will solve itself
if and when Negroes gain control of local governments in areas
where they are in the majority. This process has begun and
local school boards in Negro-controlled areas are attempting to
maintain and upgrade their school systems. After the predominantly black National Democratic Party of Alabama won
the local elections in Greene County, Alabama, last summer,
the local school board with a black majority, began to submit remarkably different and more cooperative proposed plans for disestablishing the county dual school system. Foreseeing this
possibility, whites in some predominantly black counties are
encouraging the emigration of Negroes so that the Negroes'
voting power will be reduced enough to prevent any change in
22
local government.
20. 377 U.S. 218 (1965).
21. Monroe v. Board of Commr's of the City of Jackson, 391 U.S.
450 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Joyner & Thames, Mississippi's Efforts at Industrialization: A CriticalAnalysis, 38 Miss. L.J. 433, 477 (1967).
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A second important factor in the long delay was the lack
of clarity in the Supreme Court's Brown II decision. The
decision was designed to make it clear that the Court was not
encouraging or condoning unnecessary delay. Nevertheless,
school boards and some judges were slow to respond. Much of
the delay in the courts was due to disagreement with the Brown
I decision on the part of almost everyone involved, including
23
some judges, except the plaintiffs.
Real desegregation-beyond tokenism-was held up for a
24
while when the Fifth Circuit was sidetracked and followed
25
the dictum in Briggs v. Elliott to the effect that the Constitution forbade discrimination but did not require integration and left undisturbed the people's "freedom to choose the
schools they attend. '26 No court now disputes that the correct statement of the law is that the school districts must
take affirmative action to disestablish the former dual school
systems and eliminate the effects of state imposed segregation.
These difficulties aside, there were other legal stumbling
blocks. An entire new area of the law had been opened up
in 1954 and many questions had to be answered before courts
could order the relief sought. Questions of standing to sue took
years to solve. For example, the Fifth Circuit quickly decided that it was not necessary that the plaintiffs exhaust their
administrative remedies before they turn to the federal courts,
at least in those cases where the school system had a policy of
segregation, 27 but the Fourth Circuit denied standing to
plaintiffs who had not done so. 28 Not until 1965 was it decided
that Negro students and parents have standing to challenge
faculty segregation. 29 The availability of class actions, one of
the most effective devices used by plaintiffs, had to be thrashed
out in each circuit.
Each of the state laws enacted to block desegregation had
to be laboriously attacked. The long legal battle between civil
rights attorneys and the attorneys for southern governors and
23. See Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73
YALE L.J. 90 (1963).

24. Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (1957).
25. 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955), citing Avery v. Wichita
Falls Ind. School Dist., 241 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1957).
26. Id. at 777.
27. Gibson v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Dade County, 246 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1957); Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Palm Beach
County, 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
28. Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
29. Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
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legislatures is still not over. The freedom-of-choice laws passed
in Alabama and Georgia this spring are only the most recent
episodes in the contest.
Moreover, the plaintiffs often had to prove that the statutes
were unconstitutional as applied, frequently a difficult task.
For example, a three-judge district court held that the Alabama Pupil Placement Law was not unconstitutional on its
face in 195830 and civil rights attorneys did not successfully
demonstrate
that it was being applied unconstitutionally until
31
1964.

The second striking feature of southern school desegregation is the immense amount of litigation which has been necessary for the enforcement of the fundamental legal and moral
right declared in Brown I. There are, and will continue to be,
a tremendous number of cases before the courts. For example,
more than 50,000 complaints of discrimination in employment
have been filed under section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 during the past three years! 32

From 1956, when the first

school case after Brown reached the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, through 1966 the district courts in this Circuit considered 128 school cases while the Court of Appeals reviewed
42, many more than once.33 The number has increased significantly since then. I have before my court 107 school districts which have either disestablished their dual school systems
or will within the next 30 days be under a terminal order to do so
effective September, 1970. You can imagine the time and effort required of the plaintiffs, the Justice Department as a
plaintiff-intervenor, the school boards and their attorneys and
the court to prepare, present and decide all the issues which
must be resolved in moving from dual to unitary systems. During the past 18 months these cases have occupied approximately 50 percent of my time. In addition to the desegregation
suits, every district court is subjected to a steady stream of ancillary cases arising from the problems of transition to a unitary
system. For example, school boards ask for injunctions to pre30. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372
(N.D. Ala. 1958).
31. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of :Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D.
Ala. 1964).
32. Employment Discrimination-ProceduralProblems in Title VII

SURVEy 235 (1970).
33. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,

Cases, 1 RAcE REL. L.

860 (5th Cir. 1966), afi'd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1967).
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vent mobs from blocking integration. 34 One of the disadvantages of a dual school system is the wasteful duplication of faculty and facilities. School districts which could scarcely afford
one set of schools used to try to maintain two complete systems.
Both white and black students suffered, but the black children
inevitably suffered more. One of the unintended benefits of
desegregation has been the elimination of this costly duplication. Consolidation of the school systems has meant the elimination of redundant faculty and staff. Although most desegregation orders require equal treatment of black and white
personnel, there has been a considerable amount of litigation
arising out of alleged discriminatory dismissals and demotions.
When a white and a black school are consolidated, there is room
for only one principal and vice-principal. Almost invariably
it is the black principal who is demoted or dismissed. Teaching
staffs face the same problem. When North Carolina began large
scale consolidation in 1965, over 500 Negro teachers were dismissed. 35 Many of the dismissed or demoted teachers come
to court for protection. Not all the claims are justified because many of the faculties were not qualified and the school
districts often use consolidation to upgrade their teaching staffs,
but the courts must sort out the valid claims from the specious
ones.
Black plaintiffs are no longer satisfied with access to formerly all-white schools. They often insist on a voice in the
curriculum to be offered. The demand for black studies has
moved south. When the school officials are unresponsive to requests for special programs, the plaintiffs often turn to the
courts. For example, in one of the reversals of the district
court in the SteUi case, the Fifth Circuit ordered the Savannah, Georgia, schools to provide remedial education programs
to overcome the past inadequacies in the education of the transferring Negro students. 86
Segregation has been so thoroughly ingrained in the
South that its effects touch almost everything. The courts
34. Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.

1956); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 834 (1957); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909, 932 (1959).

35. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1965, at 1, col. 4, cited in Note, The Courts,
HEW and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 331 n.38
(1963).

36. Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ. for City of Savannah, 387 F.2d

486 (5th Cir. 1967).
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have had to forbid segregated P.T.A.s, buses and bus routes,
extracurricular activities, athletic associations, libraries, faculties
and staffs.
The number of judges on the Court of Appeals was expanded in order to handle the increased case load; the Fifth
Circuit now has more active appellate judges than any other
circuit. Senate Bill 952, 37 to increase the number of district
judges in the country, includes several new judgeships in the
Fifth Circuit.
The mass of litigation resulted in major disparities among
court approved plans. In order to e][iminate the variations, the
Fifth Circuit prepared a model decree in 1966, which served as
a minimum standard for the school boards and district courts. 38

I shall not go into the details of the decree because subsequent
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions have made it obsolete, but basically it called for faculty desegregation and
freedom-of-choice pupil placement combined with the closing of
inferior Negro schools effective by the beginning of the 1967-68
school year. The decision was important because it emphasized
the affirmative duty of the school districts not merely to end
segregation but to eliminate discrimination and its effects. Tactically, it was important because it meant that the delay inherent
in litigation and appellate review was cut to a minimum. The
courts now had a standard against which to evaluate proposed
plans. For example, shortly after the model decree was issued
two school cases reached the Court of Appeals. 39 The district courts had approved plans which lacked the safeguards provided in the model decree and waived the choice form mailing
requirement. Within four days the court summarily reversed and
remanded the cases with instructions to the district courts to
enter decrees containing desegregation plans conforming to the
Jefferson decree. 40 The district court on remand entered a
decree almost identical to the model decree 4' within a month.
Of course, a model decree, although denominated a minimum, may soon come to be the maximum for all practical purposes. This danger did not materialize because the Jefferson
37. S. 952, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

(Passed Senate June 23,

1969).
38. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836

(5th Cir. 1966), af'd on rehearingen bane, 380 F.2d 385 (1967).
39. Bivens v. Board of Educ. No. 24754 (5th Cir., May 24, 1967);
Richard v. Christ, 377 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1967).
40. Id.

41. Bivens v. Board of Educ., No. 1926 (M.D. Ga., June 29, 1967).
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decree went much further than the majority of district court
judges had been willing to go theretofore.42 When it became evident that freedom of choice was not going to work, the courts
turned to other, more effective means. District courts are now
attempting to follow the standards set in Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School District,43 although no model decree as such was made part of that decision. The Court of
Appeals directed the district courts to approve only those plans
which provided for immediate and complete desegregation of
faculty and staff, transportation, facilities, athletics and other
extracurricular activities. Commencing in September, 1970,
the student bodies are to be merged into a unitary system. No
more delay is to be tolerated by the courts.
All this has been very abstract and intellectual. In order
more adequately to understand some of the problems, let me
describe in some detail one case, Lee v. Macon County Board of
Education.44 It began as an ordinary school desegregation case
when 13 Negro children brought a class action in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking
admission to the white high school in Tuskegee. Tuskegee is
located in Macon County just east of Montgomery. The county
is predominantly black but until recently the whites controlled
all the political offices, including the Board of Education. In
July, 1963, the Department of Justice entered the suit to represent the public interest and in August 1963, I entered an order
requiring the school board and its superintendent to make an
immediate start in the desegregation of the Macon County public schools.4 r The Board assigned the 13 Negro plaintiffs to the
until then all-white Tuskegee Public High School.
When the school opened Labor Day morning it was surrounded by over 100 State highway troopers dispatched during
the night by Governor Wallace, who had ordered that the
school opening be delayed one week because the "forced and
unwarranted integration" had produced a condition in Alabama
"calculated to result in a disruption of the peace and tranquillity
of this state and to occasion peril to the lives and property of
the citizens thereof." Governor Wallace had also sent State
troopers to block court-ordered desegregation in Birmingham
42. Gozansky, Gignilliat & Horwitz, School Desegregation in the
Fifth Circuit,1968 HousToN L. REV. 946, 959 n.100.
43. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. 1963).

45. Id.
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and Mobile schools. All five federal district judges in Alabama joined in issuing a temporary injunction restraining Governor Wallace and others from enforcing the Governor's orders
forbidding school desegregation. 46 Nevertheless, the harm was
done: the tensions and fears aroused by the Governor's inflammatory statements and actions undid. the efforts of the Macon
County school board to prepare the community for desegregation. When the high school finally opened, only 35 of the 250
white students appeared for classes. Within three days public
pressure forced all of them to withd[raw. Some of the whites
organized a private school, called -the Macon Academy, and
applied for tuition grants from the State under a statute enacted to cover such emergencies as the one in Tuskegee. The
others transferred to all-white schools in neighboring towns, using the public school buses. After the County Board was
ordered to cease the transportation of white students to nearby
Shorter and Notasulga High Schools, State highway patrol cars
and a school bus previously used by a State public vocational
school were pressed into service by the State. In January
and February 1964, the State Board ordered the Macon County
Board to close Tuskegee High and transfer the students to
the nearest school-which meant the all-black Tuskegee Institute High School-and to provide grants-in-aid to the students
who had enrolled in Macon Academy. The State Board of Education concluded by resolving that
the State Board .

.

. deplores the order of Judge Johnson and

pledges every resource at our command to defend the people
of our State against every order of the Federal courts in attempting to integrate the public schools of this State and will
use every legal means at our command to defeat said integration
orders .... 47
Acting pursuant to a court order after Tuskegee High
was closed, the Negro students attempted to enroll at Shorter
and Notasulga High Schools on February 5. However, the
Mayor of Notasulga prevented the entrance of six Negro students to the Notasulga School, claiming that their attendance
would create a fire hazard in violation of a city ordinance enacted the night before. Mayor Rea yielded to an injunction;
meanwhile, the State Department of Education expedited accreditation of Macon Academy.
The massive intervention by the Governor and other
State officials provided the means to shortcut in Alabama
46. United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
47. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. at 749.
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the slow district-by-district litigation which was taking so much
time and effort all over the South. The plaintiffs asked for
the convening of a three-judge district court to declare the
State grant-in-aid law unconstitutional and requested the court
to find that the Governor as ex officio president of the State
Board of Education had "asserted a general control and supervision over all public schools of the state." They prayed for a
single desegregation order directing the State officials to carry
out the desegregation of all the public school systems not then
under court order.
The three-judge court held the grant-in-aid payments unconstitutional and forbade the State to close schools in some
areas while maintaining them in others. 48 It found that the
State of Alabama continued to have an official policy favoring
racial segregation in public education and that the State
Board of Education and Superintendent of Education enforced that policy through their control of funds, textbooks,
transportation and school construction. The court ordered the
Macon County Board to prepare a plan for the implementation of further desegregation in the county and enjoined the
State officials from interfering with the local board, but the
court refrained at that time from issuing a state-wide desegregation order on the representation of the defendant State officials that they would not interfere with local school systems in
the future.
Early in 1965, several counties, which have such a low Negro
population that the maintenance of a dual school system was
very burdensome, had submitted compliance plans for all twelve
grades even though the Office of Education Guidelines then
only required four grades. The Governor sent telegrams urging
the county boards of education to reconsider their action. Most
of the boards yielded to the pressure from the Governor's office.
The State Board of Education, using its power over school construction and transportation, required local boards to continue to
maintain dual school systems.
In the fall of 1966, Governor Wallace mounted an attack on
the 1966 Guidelines. A new tuition-grant law was enacted49 and
a new interposition resolution, directed at the "Washington bureaucrats," was enacted,r0 over the opposition of a handful of
State legislators and the white teachers' lobby.
48. Id. at 754.
49. No. 16, [1966] Ala. Acts Spec. Sess. 32.
50. No. 252, [1966] Ala. Acts Spec. Sess. 372.
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The local boards of education throughout the State that were
not under court order (102 of them) were now caught between
HEW and the new State statutes. When the superintendent of
the Tuscaloosa schools assigned two Negroes to teach white students, he received an indignant telephone call from the Governor's legal advisor who threatened that the Governor might use
his "police power to enforce the law." When the superintendent
refused to back down, the State Board of Education announced
that it would allocate additional teacher units to any school
which had an integrated faculty so that students could have a
choice of the race of their teacher.
In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, plaintiffs returned to court, now able to demonstrate beyond peradventure
that the State had usurped the power of the local school boards
and was likely to continue to do so in. the interest of maintaining
segregation unless enjoined by the court.
The three-judge court found that the State officials had used
their
authority as a threat and as a means of punishment to prevent
local school officials from fulfilling their constitutional obligation to desegregate the schools, and ... they have performed
their own functions in such a way as to maintain and preserve
the racial characteristics of the system.51
The court brought under its injunction all 102 of the State's 120
school districts which were not already under court order, and
placed upon the new State Superintendent of Education, Ernest
Stone, the duty of carrying out the court's order. Each local
district was required to begin desegxegation upon pain of losing
State funds and to make periodic progress reports. The court
specified the steps the local districts were to take in a Jeffersontype order. The tuition grant law was declared unconstitutional.
The vast majority of school districts complied with the order
and continue to do so with significant results. In 1966 only
0.34 percent of the Negroes in Alabama attended integrated
schools; for the 1967-68 school year the number increased to
6.3 percent. In this school year the percentage jumped to over
33 percent. With the commencement of the next school year in
September 1970, it will reach over 90 percent.
Supervising 102 school systems is a tremendous task for three
federal judges who have been obliged to become experts in desegregation and education almost overnight. There is a multi51. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D.
Ala. 1967).
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plicity of details to be taken into account. For example, in April
1968, the court ordered the merger of the two high school athletic
associations, one black and one white.52 Only recently have
black athletic teams begun to play white teams.
The volume of litigation has become so great that the attorneys
for the original Negro plaintiffs have been forced to rely, to a
considerable degree, on the Justice Department to handle the
bulk of the preparation and presentation of the cases. This problem was alleviated somewhat when the black teachers' organization, Alabama State Teachers Association (ASTA) was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff to protect the rights of the black
teachers. ASTA had a litigation fund, and it engaged Fred Gray
and the other civil rights lawyers who had been handling the
desegregation suits. ASTA has now merged with the Alabama
white teachers organization, but NEA, the national teachers organization, replaced ASTA as a plaintiff-intervenor.
Freedom of choice, the plan adopted by almost all of the
school districts, really began to work only after the court began
ordering the closing of substandard Negro schools, leaving the
Negroes no place to go but the nearest white school. In 1968,
the plaintiffs and the Justice Department asked the court to
order the abandonment of freedom of choice in 76 of the 102
school systems. In August 1968, the court denied the motions,
but permitted continued operation of freedom of choice only on
condition that faculties be integrated on a one to six basis, certain
Negro schools be closed, and minimum percentages of Negroes
choose or be assigned to white schools.
In October 1968, the court entered an order finding that
most of the school systems had complied with the faculty desegregation provision of the August order, but that some 19
systems had failed to comply. The Boards of Education and the
superintendents for these systems were made parties-defendant
and ordered to show cause why the court should not require the
systems to adopt some plan other than freedom of choice. The
remaining school systems then brought themselves into compliance.
Last summer, after motions for further relief were filed by the
government and the plaintiffs, the court required all those systems which had not fully disestablished their dual school systems
to submit a terminal plan no later than December 1, 1969,
52. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D.
Ala. 1968).
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whereby complete disestablishment was to be accomplished by
September 1970. The court has spent most of this winter and
spring evaluating the plans and holding formal hearings and
conferences on the merits of the plans and objections submitted
by the plaintiffs, the Justice Department and the school boards.
In 1969-70-the current school year-approximately 33 percent
of Negro students in the 102 school districts in Lee attended desegregated schools and 32 school systems completely abolished
their dual systems prior to this school year. Most of these districts had a relatively low percentage of black students and accomplished disestablishment by closing their Negro schools and
assigning the black students to white schools. The black teachers
and staff were absorbed into the now unitary school systems.
The terminal plans the court is approving usually provide for
zoning and/or consolidation and pairing of black and white
schools. It is difficult to predict what the reaction to the implementation of the plans next fall will be. No one expects anything like the ugly violence that has occurred in Lamar, South
Carolina. Because the remaining questions before the court in
the systems where unitary plans have been formulated and
ordered are local in nature and the State officials have stopped
resisting, the three-judge court just two weeks ago transferred
approximately 50 of these systems to the Northern and Southern
Districts of Alabama, pursuant to title 28, section 1404a, United
States Code. This decentralization will make the school boards'
task of reporting to the court easier and relieve the three-judge
court of much of the administrative detail with which it has
been dealing heretofore.
Perhaps it is possible to extrapolate from the experience of
the school districts which were ordered to disestablish their
school systems this January and February by the Supreme Court
and the Fifth Circuit. Of course, it must be remembered that
some of the problems those systems incurred may have been
due to the disruption caused by the speed and unexpectedness
with which they were required to complete the desegregation
process. The general pattern has been that in those schools
where the whites are a majority 'of 60 percent or more, the desegregation has been accomplished without serious incident.
Where the whites are in a minority, they have withdrawn from
the public schools and established private schools. The cost of
tuition is a staggering burden for many parents. Some of the
states are resurrecting grant-in-aid laws and contemplating
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tax relief for parents and donors. 53 State tuition aid laws have
been held unconstitutional by the courts many times on the
ground that they are merely a device for perpetuating segregated
schools. In effect the state aid was available only to white
children because the statutes or school board policy limited the
aid to whites who refused to attend integrated schools or because
only white private schools had been established.
Many private schools have managed to maintain successful
operations in Alabama so far, but it is not clear whether they
will be able to continue to do so when every county has its own
academy or academies. Many people all over the State contribute on principle to the private schools already in existence.
When these contributions have to be spread over many more
schools, each school will be much less well off. Macon and
Lowndes Academies, for example, have been receiving support
from all over Alabama. When that support is diverted to nearer
schools, the academies will suffer. If the Internal Revenue
Service denies the charitable deduction benefit to contributors
to segregated schools, the amount of support the schools can
expect will decrease further. There will be a large number of
private academies in Alabama next year, in any case. There are
several counties in Alabama where the whites are in the minority. Even in a county like Montgomery, where the whites
constitute 62 percent of the population, there are plans for four
new private schools to open next fall, supplementing the existing six private schools.
The South is beginning to confront the problem of de facto
segregation. Although there is less residential segregation than
in large Northern cities and their suburbs, the amount in the
South is increasing and court-ordered desegregation is speeding
up the process as whites whose children have been assigned by
zoning to majority black schools move to neighborhoods where
the schools are majority white.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has ruled
on the constitutionality of de facto segregation. In Jefferson the
Court of Appeals left "the problems of de facto segregation in a
unitary system to solution in appropriate cases by the appropriate courts.15 4 It is ironic and tragic that as the end of State
imposed segregation in the South comes into view, the perhaps
more intractable problem of de facto segregation looms ahead.
53. Birmingham Post Herald, January 12, 1970.
54. 380 F.2d at 389 n.1.

